To deceive or not to deceive! Legal implications of phishing covert research by Sugiura, Lisa
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   Int. J. Intellectual Property Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2013 285    
 
   Copyright © 2013 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
To deceive or not to deceive! Legal implications of 
phishing covert research 
Rasha Salah El-Din* 
Department of Computer Science, 
Deramore Lane, University of York, 




Faculty of Health Sciences, 
University of Southampton, 
Highfield, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK 
E-mail: ls3e10@soton.ac.uk 
Abstract: Whilst studying mobile users’ susceptibility to phishing attacks, we 
found ourselves subject to regulations concerning the use of deception in 
research. We argue that such regulations are misapplied in a way that hinders 
the progress of security research. Our argument analyses the existing 
framework and the ethical principles of conducting phishing research in light of 
these regulations. Building on this analysis and reflecting on real world 
experience; we present our view of good practice and suggest guidance on how 
to prepare legally compliant proposals to concerned ethics committees. 
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This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘To deceive or 
not to deceive! Legal implications of phishing covert research’ presented at The 
International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT Laws, 
Athens, Greece, 2–4 October 2012. 
 
1 Introduction 
Phishing is a fraudulent attempt seeking to acquire money and confidential information 
such as usernames, passwords or credit card details from people by masquerading trust 
worthy entities such as banks, service providers, systems or institutions. Phishing 
research aims to design countermeasures against such malicious attempts and to protect 
people from falling for them. The first step to accomplish such goal is to understand the 
dynamics of phishing, and to analyse people decision making strategies reacting to 
phishing attacks. 
However, studying people’s online behaviour and the variance in their vulnerability 
to phishing is a much under researched area. The reason is that obtaining observational 
data about users’ security practices is extremely challenging (Dourish et al., 2004). When 
people are informed that their behaviour is being monitored, they tend to behave 
differently than they normally do. And when they are being monitored without being 
notified, the research regarded, most of the time, as illegal. 
In this paper, we discuss the legal implications of the use of covert studies in phishing 
research. This paper is structured as follows: We first analyse the existing framework of 
conducting phishing research and the legal issues they raise. We give particular attention 
to covert studies. We start by defining deceptive experiments. Then, we analysed the 
implications of deceptive research from two perspectives; ethics committees and phishing 
researchers. Finally, we present our view of good practice and outline a roadmap for 
phishing researchers for designing legal phishing experiments. 
2 Background 
Generally, there are two main approaches for phishing research: correlational and 
experimental. The latter is the most ecologically valid, yet the most legally complicated 
(Salah El-Din, 2012). 
Below, we compare the two approaches, the ethical and legal challenges associated 
with each and why phishing researchers give preference to experimental covert studies. 
2.1 Correlational research 
In correlational approach, researchers analyse what naturally goes on the world without 
directly interfering with it, observe natural events or take a snapshot of different 
variables. Mainly, there are two principal correlational methodologies: naturalistic 
observation and self-report studies. 
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2.1.1 Naturalistic observation 
Naturalistic observation entails observing and recording the variables of interest to the 
research in their natural environment without any interference by the researcher (Bagley, 
2007). 
In phishing research and under the correlational approach, this method involves 
monitoring honey pots activities. This sort of observation introduces serious ethical and 
legal considerations. Yet, it gives the experimenter the opportunity to view the variable of 
interest in a natural setting, can offer ideas for further research and may be the only 
option in cases where lab experimentation are not possible for the researcher to run. 
Observing honey pots can have different scenarios, here are the main two ones: 
a Scenario 1: The researcher is conducting his observational study with the help of 
some criminals. 
b Scenario 2: The researcher is working secretly without any criminal contact. 
Accordingly, this type of research involves both direct and indirect contact between three 
kinds of stakeholders; the researcher, victims and attackers. 
Below, we demonstrate ethical and legal considerations in relation to each 
stakeholder. 
A Ethical and legal considerations for the first stakeholder; the victims 
• Anonymity: The victims who were monitored by the researcher have the right to 
remain anonymous through the study and in any publications that may result of 
the research. 
• Confidentiality: The confidentiality of the data observed is an important issue. 
The researchers may be able to access confidential information of the victims 
such as; their bank details, their home address, their e-mails, their date of birth, 
etc. All these information should not be saved or kept any place. 
• Reporting the phishing attack: According to the law, there is no legal obligation 
whatsoever if the researcher witnessed a crime and did not report it. However, 
ethics wise, reporting a law-breaking incident is a controversial issue; should the 
researcher stop a phishing attack he is observing and hence jeopardising his 
study if the attacker was alerted? Or shall he just ignore his moral responsibility 
towards his society or at least towards another human who is being attacked? 
B Ethical and legal considerations for the second stakeholder; the researcher 
• Safety: The protection of the researcher is the responsibility of the research 
institution or the affiliated industry. 
• Anonymity: Special internet technologies that enable online anonymity should be 
in place to conceal the researcher location or usage and to protect him from 
network surveillance or traffic analysis. An example of these is TOR anonymity 
network (Dittrich et al., 2009). 
• Special training: For scenario 2, it is advisable that the researcher should take a 
proper training of the etiquette of getting involved in a criminal environment. It 
is worth that the researcher seeks advice from an undercover reporter or a 
criminologist. 
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C Ethical and legal considerations for the third stakeholder: the criminal 
• Privacy: Despite that the data monitored is private criminal data, it is still 
governed by the data protection act. Accordingly, the researcher is advised to 
consult a legal professional to make sure his research is in compliance with DPA 
1998. 
• Anonymity: The criminal has the right to remain anonymous through the study 
and in any publications. 
• Informed consent: An explicit consent should be secured with the criminal in 
advance. 
2.1.2 Self-report studies 
Phishing surveys are usually used to measure phishing via self-report studies. This 
involves the use of questionnaires, interviews or polls to gather information from people 
about their past phishing experience, recent losses or latest corruptions of systems and 
credentials (Jakobsson and Finn, 2007). 
This research approach has many limitations as it may underestimate the risk of 
phishing in case the surveys’ participants missed reporting a significant number of 
phishing incidents. This occurs if the participants were victims of phishing without 
actually recognising this or they were aware they were attacked but too embarrassed to 
reveal this to the researcher. 
Additionally, surveys can overestimate the risk of phishing if the participants 
mistakenly report non-phishing incidents as phishing ones. This happens when 
participants got confused between phishing messages and genuine ones they get from 
their bank, mobile operator or a legitimate service provider. 
Limitations of phishing surveys differ according to its running procedures. For 
example, the underestimation or overestimation of phishing risk increases more in polls 
and online surveys than in interviews where the direct contact between the researcher and 
the participants help getting more precise answers. 
Regarding interviews, they have their own limitations that are driven by two main 
factors; the researcher’s effect and evaluation apprehension. 
1 The researcher’s effect 
 The researcher effect is a problem that affects the ecological validity of the results as 
the participants want to impress the researcher and look smarter in front of her. They 
claim to do something, regarding their security practices, but in reality they do 
something else. Here, the age, gender or race of the researchers may affect the result 
they obtain (Field and Hole, 2003). 
2 The evaluation apprehension 
 The evaluation apprehension is another problem that occurs mostly in interviews and 
lab studies. It refers to a special type of anxiety that arises when participants think 
the researcher is testing their abilities or evaluating their performance (Bagley, 
2007). Any change in the participants’ behaviour as a result of such belief leads to 
flawed studies. 
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2.2 Experimental research 
In experimental research, we have two approaches: quasi experiments and naturalistic 
experiments. 
2.2.1 Quasi experiments 
Phishing researchers often turn to quasi experimental approach when they cannot perform 
real experiments. In phishing quasi experiments, a closed lab experiment is conducted in 
a controlled environment where the participants are shown a number of e-mail messages 
and websites and are asked to distinguish between phishing and legitimate ones. Lab 
studies are often used to measure users’ ability to detect phishing. They are also called 
‘Phishing IQ Tests’. 
The main drawback of phishing quasi experiments is that they are measuring response 
to phishing as the primary goal of the participants while that is not the case in real life. 
Phishing detection in particular and security practices in general are not tasks in 
themselves (Whitten and Tygar, 1999). Instead, security is an impeded task in everyday 
tasks. Hence, this type of research is actually creating an artificial environment of  
non-natural tasks that users never perform in real life. 
In addition, the participants in phishing lab studies know they are part of an 
experiment. They are aware that both the data and the attack is fake, hence, they do not 
act to protect the data as if it were actually their own (Jakobsson and Finn, 2007). 
Adding evaluation apprehension, mentioned earlier, to the drawbacks of quasi 
experiments, makes it hard for phishing researchers to generalise their results to the real 
world. Accordingly, they go for more reliable methodologies. Here, naturalistic 
experiments can help observing people in more natural settings and at the same time 
isolating the causal variables studied and ruling out all other explanations of the effect; 
confound variables. That is why many phishing researchers prefer naturalistic covert 
experiments as explained below. 
2.2.2 Naturalistic covert experiments 
In phishing covert studies, researchers simulate a real phishing attack and observe 
participant’s behaviour towards it. Therefore, researchers need to deceive the participants 
to the real purpose of the study. 
Using deception in phishing research requires that researchers deliberately withhold 
the research purpose and some of the research procedures from the participants. The 
rationale behind that is to avoid unbiased results that are more likely to occur if the 
participants are aware they are participating in a phishing study. 
3 The legal challenges of phishing deceptive research 
Acquiring ethical clearance is a compulsory prerequisite for conducting phishing 
research. Consequently, covert studies need to be reviewed and approved by the ethics 
committees of the concerned research institutions; a process that has never been easy or a 
straight forward one. The reason is that most of these studies proposals get rejected by the 
ethics committees due to the use of deception (Soghoian, 2008). This situation raises a 
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controversial issue; “Can we deceive users, if our goal is to better understand how they 
are deceived by attackers?” (P1) (Dittrich et al., 2009). 
3.1 Deception from ethics committees perspective 
Many ethics committees regard the use of deception in research as illegal, unethical, 
contradicts with informed consent and potentially harmful to the participants; a  
deep-rooted situation that has changed over time. Now, deception is a well-established 
research methodology, and its usage has been acknowledged by the APA in 1982. Since 
then, it has been used continually and extensively in about 60% of all studies (Whitten 
Whitten, 1999) to the extent that now, many research subjects are expecting deception at 
some point even in studies that truly do not involve deception. 
However, this did not help much in getting many deceptive research proposals 
accepted, especially phishing ones. Ethics committees state they cannot justify deceiving 
people for the interest of research. They stress on the fact that generating new knowledge 
should never override the participants’ welfare (Athanassoulis and Wilson, 2009). They 
regard deception a limitation to the participants control over psychological damage or 
distress they may be exposed to. 
These objections are mostly framed in breaking the following laws: 
• Human Rights Act 
• Fraud Act 
• Data Protection Act 
• spam e-mails and text legislations. 
In our road map explained in Section 4, we guide phishing researchers on how to prepare 
legally compliant proposals that abide by the above mentioned laws. 
3.2 Deception from phishing researchers’ perspective 
Deception advocates call ethics committees to look at the details of deceptive studies 
rather than to base their decision on merely the use of deception. They insist that “given 
the fact that a piece of research involves deception does not in and of itself make it 
morally problematic” (Athanassoulis and Wilson, 2009) but rather the rationale behind 
withholding information from the person being deceived. And phishing research, by 
nature, ‘must’ include some degree of deception, as it measures deception primarily. 
They argue that “the very strong form of deception can be used in utterly harmless and 
delightful way” (p.4). 
Moreover, some deception proponents made a case about ‘the joy of being deceived’ 
where they proved that deception was actually a source of pleasure to participants. 
Conducting comparative studies that measure participants’ opinion about deception, they 
showed that 84% to 95% of the participants enjoyed deceptive studies more than  
non-deceptive ones (Athanassoulis and Wilson, 2009). They were also educated more in 
deceptive studies especially via the debriefing sessions. Researchers confirm that 
deceptive studies that do not investigate private behaviour are entirely safe. 
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4 A road map to legal phishing research 
Our earlier analysis shows there exists a conflict between phishing researchers and ethics 
committees which results in researchers’ inability to peruse their phishing covert 
research. Building on this analysis and reflecting from own real world experience of 
designing mobile phishing experiments; we present a roadmap for phishing researchers to 
help them design legally complaint studies. This road map was reached by working 
closely with our ethics committee, our data protection registrar and our low clinic 
professionals. 
Each road map dimension defines one central legal or ethical aspect of conducting 
phishing deceptive research. The overall roadmap consists of three categories that group 
together 11 different dimensions. The phishing roadmap categories and dimensions are as 
follows with dimensions indented below categories: 
• Pre-launching phishing simulated attack 
1 preparing fraudulent text 
2 preparing press release 
3 warning administrative bodies 
4 pre-informed consent 
5 statement of confidentiality 
• Launching phishing simulated attack 
1 data protection 
2 protecting the researchers 
3 minding the participants’ wellbeing 
• Post-launching phishing simulated attack 
1 debriefing the participants 
2 post-informed consent 
3 data protection. 
Each of the 11 dimensions has several indicators that define an ultimate goal for the 
dimension to ensure legal and ethical conduct of the study. Below, we explain some of 
these goals. 
4.1 Preparing the fraudulent text 
The fraudulent text should ideally be a simple request and should avoid any element of 
coercion that could cause anxiety or distress. For example, if the phishing message is 
pretended to be sent from a university institution targeting university’s students, the text 
should never threaten the students of cancelling their university enrolment or imposing a 
fine. 
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4.2 Warning concerned bodies 
Phishing researchers need to contact the subjects’ first point of contact such as IT 
support, help desk and administrative staff as participants may report the ‘phishing 
attacks’ and this would avoid time spent chasing the attacks up. 
4.3 Pre-informed consent 
Researchers have to secure an informed consent signed by their study participants prior to 
starting the study. We advise them to state that some aspects of the study will be revealed 
to the participants in later stages. 
4.4 Debriefing participants 
Researchers need to ensure participants are provided with sufficient information at the 
earliest possible stage. 
4.5 Post-informed consent 
Researchers have to secure an informed consent signed by their study participants after 
the phishing part is conducted and the participants have been debriefed about the real 
purpose of the study. 
4.6 Minding the participants wellbeing 
Researchers should be aware that the welfare of their participants are minded according 
to the duty of care law, otherwise, a duty of care is owed to the plaintiff. For that, our 
road map outlines a procedure that involves consulting appropriately upon the way that 
the withholding of information or deliberate deception will be received. An ‘anxiety and 
panic handling’ training is a must (both universities’ counselling service and health and 
wellbeing service can assist in that). A follow up after-care is advised once the study has 
been completed to ensure that the individuals did not feel bad about themselves or the 
way they were treated. 
4.7 Data protection 
Researchers must comply with human rights Act 1998. This includes paying attention to 
participants’ right in privacy and also being aware that the act has to be balanced against 
the wider public interest and good. In our own mobile phishing experiments, a new ‘pay 
as you go’ SIM card had to be used and to be dedicated only to the experiment. It had to 
be kept secured in a locked filling cabinet in a locked room. As soon as the study was 
finished, the data was deleted prior to the SIM physical destruction. 
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5 Conclusions and future work 
Although deception is a well-established research methodology in psychology, there is no 
clear law that neither allows nor prohibits deceptive phishing research to be used in 
security research in general or phishing research in particular. In the absence of an 
affiliated law, we believe the research community need to start a dialogue on  
self-regulation and boundaries of legal and ethical conduct. 
We are currently in the process of organising an international conference to discuss 
the legal and ethical challenges that face phishing researchers. The conference will source 
multi-discipline expertise including: phishing researchers, board members of ethics 
committees, law professionals and industries affected by phishing such as mobile phone 
operators and banks. 
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